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Abstract
In this paper, a simple model is proposed to endogenize voting behavior
that incorporates a sense of duty to vote. We assume that a sense of
duty to vote is an increasing function of a person’s human capital and
the public faith in politics, and those with a higher sense of duty often
vote. Then, we examine the relationship between income redistribution
policy and human capital accumulation. From our assumption, the voter
turnout is expected to gradually increase as human capital accumulates.
However, we show that, in some cases, the positive relationship between
voter turnout and human capital accumulation is not necessarily hold. In
addition, the eﬀect of growing inequality on the redistribution policy is
investigated.
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11 Introduction
Many researchers have recently examined income distribution. Among them,
Meltzer and Richard(1981), Persson and Tabellini(1994), and Benabou(1996,
2000) have analyzed models of income inequality with redistribution policies.
In these models, the income redistribution policies are related to the median
voter theorem or similar ideas. Thus, a decisive agent is the median voter or
that at a speciﬁc percentile point, which is determined exogenously, of income
distribution. When the median voter theorem does hold, the problem of who
is the pivotal voter can be replaced by that of who is the median of the distri-
bution that consists of the voting participants. Such a distribution is obtained
by endogenizing the voting behavior of agents. In this paper, we will endog-
enize the agents’ choice of whether or not to vote because doing so seems to
have some signiﬁcance. First, according to earlier studies, the inﬂuence of the
taxation-redistribution scheme on economic performance seems to be broadly
divided into two types: (i)a negative eﬀect of reducing labor supply and in-
vestment; and (ii)a positive eﬀect, such as insurance against uncertainty and
the imperfection of (human) capital market. As described above, endogeniz-
ing voting behavior entails deciding who is the pivotal voter and thus directly
aﬀects the (post-tax) income distribution and economic performance. Second,
voter turnout can be regarded as a measure of democracy. In the ﬁeld of po-
litical science, what kind of political regime, including dictatorship, oligarchy,
and democracy, is desirable is a fundamental issue. Especially, democracy has
been historically looked with doubtful eyes at least until the middle of 20th
century because it may fall into the populism. As shown later in this paper,
the more educated and wealthier citizens tend to vote with greater regularity
and number, which increases their inﬂuences at the polls. Hence, it is believed
that a low turnout is more meritocratic and, conversely, a high turnout is more
2populistic in a democratic economy. Lijphart(1997) argues that turnout should
be higher because an unequal turnout is biased against less well-to-do citizens
and, even if the abstention is the expression of their aﬃrmative willingness, their
will is never counted, i.e., ”voice and exit are often alternative ways of exerting
inﬂuence but with regard to voting the exit option spells no inﬂuence; only voice
can have an eﬀect”. Lijphart discusses the low voter turnout in the U.S., which
is particularly lower than that in other developed countries, and making voting
compulsory might be an alternative for this. Third, in association with the ﬁrst
and the second, voter turnout can aﬀect the economic performance through in-
come redistribution. To the best of our knowledge, few studies have analyzed
the relationship between voting behavior and economic growth. One exception
is the work of Mueller and Stratmann(2003), who presented cross-sectional ev-
idence showing that high levels of democratic participation are associated with
more equal income distribution and high participation rates are related to larger
government sectors that lead to slower economic growth. In a theoretical study,
Arawatari(2008) endogenizes voting behavior, although diﬀerently from the way
this is done in our study, and investigates its eﬀect on growth and income dis-
tribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a survey of the
relationship between voting behavior and earlier research, in particular, that
concerning rational choice theory serving as a base for the construction of a
voting model; in addition, the objectives of the study are stated. Section 3 is
the introduction of a simple endogenous voting model. Section 4 contains a
proposal for a standard income redistribution model and a derivation of a polit-
ical equilibrium. Section 5 contains the results of an analysis of the model and
an examination of the relationship among voter turnout, income redistribution,
and income inequality. Section 6 concludes.
32 Related Literature
In the literature of rational choice theory, the determinants of political partici-
pation and the reason that people vote have been an important topic for a long
time. The rational voter hypothesis was ﬁrst developed by Downs(1957). He ob-
served that the rational voters vote when a payoﬀ is anticipated: PB − C > 0,
where P is the probability that a person’s vote is the decisive one and B is
the beneﬁt that a person would gain from having his/her preferred candidate
win rather than lose. C represents the cost of voting, such as the opportu-
nity cost. However, probability(or expected beneﬁt) is practically bound to be
minuscule in an election with a large number of electors and therefore, a per-
son’s expected payoﬀ is approximately −C. The reason that people have for
voting(i.e., the paradox of voting) need to be examined.1 To explain this para-
dox, Riker and Ordeshook(1968) propose a solution by modifying the inequality
PB+D−C > 0, in which D is a sense of duty to vote or the utility from voting
behavior itself. This modiﬁcation suggests that voting is not undertaken as an
instrumental act to determine a winning candidate but, rather, as a private or
symbolic act from which satisfaction is derived independently of the outcome of
the election. Furthermore, many empirical studies are consistent with the fact
that this term is very signiﬁcant for explaining voting behavior. Schram(1992),
for instance, shows that party choice(the choice of preferred policy) and turnout
decisions are made sequentially and independently and that ”The role of a sense
of ’Civic Duty’ in the decision to vote or abstain and the origin of this sense
are examples of processes that are related to the act of casting of a vote per se
but do not play a role in the individual party choice.” Thus, a sense of duty
aﬀects not the decision-making that occurs in the ballot booth but the deci-
1From the point of view of rational choice theory, a detailed and inclusive discussion about
the paradox of voting can be found in Feddersen(2004).
4sion of whether or not to vote and there is considerable explanatory evidence.2
Blais(2000) examines in detail which variables, P, B, C, or D, aﬀects the voting
behavior and how. According to his study, P, the probability that their vote
decides who wins, matters in such a way that the closeness of the election fosters
voter turnout but its impact is small. and marginal. As for B, the beneﬁt that
he/she would gain from having his/her preferred candidate win, the fact that
more important elections, such as legislative elections, attract more voters than
local elections, in which the stakes are perceived to be smaller, is consistent
with rational choice theory; however, turnout in presidential elections in coun-
tries where the president has little power, such as Austria, Iceland, and Ireland,
is remarkably high and has an ambiguous impact. With regard to C, the cost of
voting, such as the opportunity cost and bad weather, is strikingly small, and
the inﬂuence on turnout is only marginal. Then, he concludes that terms P, B,
and C lack validity for explaining voting behavior and D is the most signiﬁcant
variable. He uses a questionnaire to screen individuals and measure their sense
of duty and clariﬁes that those with a strong duty for voting genuinely believe
that it would be wrong not to vote. He concludes that ”it is diﬃcult to argue
that sense of duty is not powerful motivation for voting.”3
In this study, we discuss not only what the motivation for voting is but also
what important attributes voters have. Knack(1992) found that in the U.S.,
individuals are signiﬁcantly more likely to vote if they are married, reside in the
jurisdiction where they vote and attend church regularly. Among the character-
istics associated with high-voter turnout, education is the most inﬂuential.4 It
2For example, Ashenﬁelter and Kelly (1975): ”The theory of voting that is best supported
by our results is that which posits a sense of duty or obligation as the primary motivation for
voting.” Furthermore, Bartels and Brady (2003) survey the outcome of political participation
in political science for a few decades and conclude that the assumption of narrow self-interest
and rational agents is insuﬃcient to explain voting behavior.
3He also shows that rational choice theory has a little validity for those with a weak sense
of duty to vote.
4See also Verba et al. (1978), Mueller (2003), and their references.
5is noteworthy that voter turnout is declining in developed countries despite the
growing numbers receiving higher education.5 Arawatari(2008) refers to this
phenomenon as the ”New paradox of voting.” He focuses on the cost of voting
and emphasizes that the diﬀusion of mass media ﬁrst lowers the cost of access-
ing information about the candidates and their policies but later increases the
cost of ﬁltering information. He states that this U-shaped relationship of cost
with information introduces an inverted U-shaped relationship of turnout with
information (proportional to human capital in economy).6
Finally, we discuss the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis7; higher inequality will
create a majority for more redistribution. This negative relation between equal-
ity and redistribution is derived by Meltzer and Richard(1981) and is based
on the idea that, with a right-skewed income distribution, any voting rule that
reinforces the role of individuals below the mean income provides an incentive
for redistribution from rich to poor citizens. The Meltzer-Richard model has
been interpreted as a theory of government size, and, although it has been
tested with cross-country data, it has received little support. For example, re-
search indicates that the degree of inequality in the Scandinavian countries is
low, while their governments are large. Their model is static, but Persson and
Tabellini(1994) and Alesina and Rodrick(1994) show that the disincentives in-
troduced by redistribution last over time and lower the growth rate theoretically
and empirically. These studies extend the empirical cross-country analysis to
economic growth. However, the validity of this hypothesis is mixed, e.g., Saint-
Paul and Verdier(1996). Then, the lack of evidence in favor of the Meltzer-
5The decline of voter turnout is accurately reported by Lijphart(1997) and references
therein. According to his survey, participation in the U.S. presidential elections declined
from 60-65% in the 1950s and 1960s to 50-55% in the 1980s and 1990s.
6Unlike Arawatari(2008), Larcinese(2007a) shows a monotonic relationship between infor-
mation and turnout. Thus, political knowledge has a sizeable inﬂuence on the probability of
voting, and socio-demographic variables can have a vast impact on turnout through their eﬀect
on political knowledge. Therefore, mass media signiﬁcantly inﬂuences political participation.
7The survey about the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis can be found in Benabou(1996) as well
as in Borge and Rattso(2004) and their references.
6Richard hypothesis motivates the modiﬁcation of theory both theoretically and
empirically.
In this paper, we will focus on a sense of duty to vote, D, because, from
earlier studies, D seems to be the most important term, and propose a simple
model that describes the relation between human capital accumulation and the
voter turnout in an economy. Furthermore, as is later shown in the paper,
it is also possible to explain the declining voter turnout in several developed
countries since approximately 1970 and the relationship between redistribution
and income inequality.
3 Voting Model
In this section, we develop a voting model. In an economy, agents are distributed
on a continuum [0,1], and an individual, i, is initially endowed with human
capital, hi. As there are a large member of voters, all individuals know that
nobody can directly aﬀect the outcome through a person’s own vote; in other
words, they calculate their expected payoﬀ under P = 0, when they decide
whether or not to vote.
As described in the previous sections, we regard a sense of duty as the main
determinant of voting and formulate D more speciﬁcally. If whether or not to
vote largely depends on the moral obligation to vote, recent decline in voter
turnout, especially, that in the U.S. is due to a decline in the sense of duty. The
basic idea is borrowed from Abramson and Aldrich(1982); the dramatic decline
of voter turnout in the U.S. since the early 1960s can be largely explained by
two factors, the weakening voter identiﬁcation with the political parties and
declining beliefs in the responsiveness of government. Hence, in the current
paper, we regard weakening party identiﬁcation and disappointment with gov-
ernment as responsible for the decrease in the sense of duty to vote. From the
71960s to the 1970s, many nations around the world faced various diﬃculties. In
the U.S., the civil rights movement and the antiwar campaign against Vietnam
War had a growing inﬂuence; furthermore, the Watergate Scandal took place
in 1972. Other developed countries also experienced two oil crises, stagﬂation,
and ﬁnancial crises. It would appear that these incidents made people lose con-
ﬁdence in (large) governments and that such criticism of the welfare state later
made several countries switch political regimes from large governments to small
governments. Examples of such regimes are those of Ronald Reagan in the U.S.
(Reaganomics) and Margaret Thatcher in the U.K. (Thatcherism). On the basis
of these historical events, it seems that the moral obligation to vote increases
with conﬁdence in government, including individual party identiﬁcation,8 and
the decreases with the government scandals. Furthermore, we regard the scan-
dals as a kind of rent-seeking, such as peculation of tax revenue or ineﬃcient
supply of public goods by the government, and deﬁne that the peculation rate of
tax revenue is θ ∈ [0,1] and the conﬁdence in the government, denoted as R(·),
is a strictly decreasing and concave function of θ, R(0) = ¯ R > 0, R(1) = 0.9
Keeping in mind that more educated people tend to vote, we here take
the following position about a sense of duty to vote and the choice of voting
behavior:
Assumption 1 Individuals decide their voting behavior on the basis of the term
D, a sense of duty to vote or the utility by the voting behavior itself. It is
supposed that D of individual i is an increasing function with respect to his/her
own human capital, hi, and the conﬁdence in the government shared commonly
by all individuals, R(θ), and C > 0, the cost of voting. Hence, the behavior of
8Branton(2003) shows that individual-level party identiﬁcation is consistently associated
with voting behavior across each of the various types of ballot propositions.
9Of course voting behavior can be analyzed in diﬀerent ways. For instance, in Funk(2007),
voting is the social norm, and a person’s voting behavior is interpreted as the signal that
he/she performs his/her social duty. Furthermore, Blais(2000) indicates that delegitimation
of authority, such as secularization, makes it more diﬃcult to ascertain whether voting is good
and not voting is bad.
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> 0 → vote
= 0 → indiﬀerence
< 0 → abstention





φhi + ψR(θ), φ > 0, ψ > 0 and the threshold of human capital can then be
shown below:






    
    
> ˆ h(θ) → vote
= ˆ h(θ) → indiﬀerence
< ˆ h(θ) → abstention
The derogation of the credibility of the government by an increase of the rate
of peculation disappoints eligible voters, and, therefore, only the more educated
people vote. It follows that ˆ h increases with θ. H (·) is deﬁned as the cumulative
distribution function of human capital, and then voter turnout π is given by
π = 1 − H(ˆ h)
As ˆ h is an increasing function of θ, turnout π, ceteris paribus, decreases with the
peculation rate θ. Moreover the pivotal voter is the one who is the median of
the distribution that consists of the voting participants, and his/her percentile
of the original distribution function ˆ p is thus derived by
ˆ p − H(ˆ h)













9Namely, the percentile of the decisive agent is higher than the median of the
cumulative distribution function of human capital, and this is straightforward
because the rich tend to vote more than the poor.10
Now, let us consider that the economy consists of two groups of individuals:
the rich, denoted as r, and the poor, denoted as p, and it is assumed that the
rich are a fraction, δ < 1/2, of all individuals. Thus, the poor are a majority
in society, and their favorite policy is adopted if the policy follows a simple
majority voting. Then the distribution function of human capital is
H (h) =

    
    
0 if h ∈ [0,hp)
1 − δ if h ∈ [hp,hr)
1 if h ∈ [hr,∞)
4 The Behavior of Agents and Political Equilib-
rium
The time structure of actions of individuals (potential voters) and the govern-
ment is as follows.
1. Individuals are ”leaders.” Thus, they decide whether or not to vote and
their preferred tax rate, expecting accurately how much the government
peculate the tax revenue. Tax policy τ is determined through their voting
behavior and majority voting.
2. The government is ”follower.” The government determines the peculation
10The models that endogenize voting behavior in a democratic society resemble those that
analyze the process of democratization or the extension of suﬀrage, such as that of Acemoglu
and Robinson(2000), in that the distribution of voter and pivotal voter changes, although
they diﬀer regarding whether or not the poor are allowed to participate in politics. In fact,
Bourguignon and Verdier(2000), who study the dynamics of inequality, democratization, and
economic development in a political economy model of growth in which education is both
the engine of growth and a determinant of political participation, point out that their model
would be applicable to the case in which the citizens do not use their voting rights.
10rate θ, given τ, and facing the trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁt of expropria-
tion and the cost of derogation of the credibility.
So, ﬁrst, we solve the optimization problem of the ”follower”, government.
4.1 The behavior of the government
Although the government cannot aﬀect the policy, tax rate τ, which is decided
by majority voting, through the process of taxation and redistribution, it is
assumed that they can peculate a part of the tax revenue θτY , where θ ∈ [0,1]
represents peculation rate, and Y is the aggregate output. Let us also assume
that the peculated tax disappears and does not aﬀect the social welfare.11 Given
the tax revenue τY , the objective function of the government consists of the
amount of peculation from tax revenue and credibility by individuals, R(·); thus,
there exists a trade-oﬀ between payoﬀ by peculation and the loss of conﬁdence




For simplicity, let us assume that R(θ) = ¯ R
(
1 − θ2)
and ¯ R is a parameter that













2 ¯ R if Y
2 ¯ R > 1 and 0 ≤ τ < 2 ¯ R
Y , or Y
2 ¯ R ≤ 1
1 if Y
2 ¯ R > 1 and 2 ¯ R
Y ≤ τ ≤ 1
(2)
11These assumptions can be interpreted to represent the ineﬃciency of the government ,
e.g., the useless policy of parceling out public works projects that do not increase economic
welfare.
12Generally, conﬁdence or reputation should be analysed by dynamic models such as re-
peated games.
11The peculation rate θ increases as the tax revenue τY increases.13
4.2 The behavior of individuals
The income of an individual i is yi,(yr > yp), the average income is δyr +
(1 − δ)yp = ¯ y (= Y ) and yr > yp is equivalent to ξ − δ > 0. Now, the Gini
coeﬃcient can be obtained as ξ − δ from a simple calculation. The fraction of
the total income possessed by the rich is δyr/¯ y = ξ. From the deﬁnition of
ξ, yr = ξ¯ y/δ, and yp = (1 − ξ) ¯ y/(1 − δ). Let us also assume that the utility
of an agent equals his/her disposable income14 and that redistribution policies
are linear, with a ﬂat marginal tax rate τ and a lump-sum uniform transfer
equal to T = ¯ y
(
τ (1 − θ) − τ2/2
)
. Thus, redistribution is costly, and the loss
is normalized by average income or aggregate output. This implies that the
equilibrium tax rate does not depend in an arbitrary way on the scale of the
economy.15
Individuals choose their preferred policy while expecting the peculation by
the government.16 Thus, the optimization problem of an individual i about
his/her preferred policy is
max
τ
(1 − τ)yi + ¯ y
(




13If the utility function is not linear in θτY , the optimal rate of peculation might not be
an increasing function of Y . When F.O.C. is satisﬁed, in general, a marginal increase of
Y generates two eﬀects: ﬁrst, the marginal utility increases because of an increment of the
peculation; second, the marginal utility itself diminishes. Herein, the second eﬀect does not
exist because of the linearity of the utility function in θτY . Therefore, the larger the economy
scale is, the more ineﬃcient the government is.
14Assuming thet ”warm-glow” utility function and the same linear taxation and lump-sum
transfer redistribution with cost, the indirect utility function can be expressed by disposal
income.
15Although it’s possible to interpret that the cost of expropriation by the government is
included in the second term, −¯ yτ2/2, herein I distinguish the ﬁrst term from the second term
as followis: the former is the intentional cost by the government and the latter is the otherwise,
cost e.g., creating bureaucracy and distorting the investment and labor supply incentives.
16Even if the government and individuals behave independently from each other, the fol-
lowing result does not change.
12Substituting Equation (2) into the objective function, the solution for the
rich is
τr = 0, (3)
and the solution for the poor is
τp =
¯ R(ξ − δ)




Since the policy variable is unidimensional and this objective function is single-
peaked with respect to τ, the median voter theorem is applicable. Here, for
simplicity, let us assume that yi ≡ f
(
hi)
≡ hi, ¯ y = δyr + (1 − δ)yp = δhr +
(1 − δ)hp ≡ ¯ h.
4.3 Political equilibrium
In this subsection, combining the voting behavior and policy decision as dis-
cussed above, we derive a political equilibrium or taxation-redistribution scheme.
In this model, the equilibrium of an economy is divided into three states as shown
below.




= θi, from Equations (2) and (3),
(θr,τr,πr) = (0,0,δ) (5)
This is the case in which only the rich vote. Then, taxation-redistribution is
not conducted, and, therefore, peculation does not take place.17
On the other hand, in the case that the pivotal voters are the poor, i.e.,
17In this state, the tax revenue that is used for redistribution is zero, and this does not
necessarily mean that there is not any taxation-redistribution scheme and public service, such
as a police service and minimum bureaucracy.









¯ h(ξ − δ)
2




¯ R(ξ − δ)






In this case, even if the government peculates a part of the tax revenue, the
human capital of the poor is suﬃciently large to cast ballots, and all individuals
vote.
Moreover, there is another case such that ˆ h(θr) < hp < ˆ h(θp). In this
case, clearly the state is neither (5) nor (6); namely, the human capital of
the poor is higher than the threshold in which the rich are the pivotal voters





must be the threshold for the existence of an equilibrium
because only the state that can be an equilibrium is that the winner in an
election is neither the poor nor the rich. Then, the peculation rate of this case
is as follows:
hp =









(1 − ξ)¯ h
1 − δ
−
C − ψ ¯ R
φ
)
≡ θm (¯ h
)
Furthermore, the fact that hp is the threshold means that the poor are indiﬀerent
regarding whether or not to vote. Therefore, the number of the poor who
participate in voting can be from 0 to 1 − δ, but, if the number of poor who
vote exceeds the number of rich δ, the poor become the pivotal voters. The
correspondent peculation rate is not θm but θp, and this is not consistent with
the condition that the poor are indiﬀerent about voting behavior. The case in
which the number of the poor who vote falls below δ is similar; the correspondent
rate of peculation is not θm but θr. Then, the number of the poor that is
consistent with θm is only δ, and voter turnout is 2δ. This is also consistent
14with the condition of an equilibrium in which the winner in an election is neither
the poor nor the rich. The tax rate τm, which corresponds to θm, is derived












(1 − ξ)¯ h
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Deﬁnition 1 A political equilibrium is composed of a trio of factors. This trio
could be three types,
(
θi,τi,πi)
, i = r,p,m, expressed by (5), (6), and (7).19
Henceforth, we call equilibria deﬁned by (5), (6) and (7) as R state, P state,
and M state respectively.
5 Analysis
5.1 The eﬀect of human capital accumulation
Assumption 2





⇐⇒ ¯ h >
δ
(




Assumption 2 assures that the rich, at least, cast ballots. It follows that,
as described above, we assume a developed and democratized society in which
some people vote. Thus, the early stage of the process is the R state. In the
R state, the tax rate determined by majority voting is 0. Thus, peculation
does not arise, and the threshold of human capital regarding whether or not
vote is ˆ h(0) =
(
C − ψ ¯ R
)
/φ. After that, when the human capital of the poor
18This state is unstable in the sense that the equilibrium cannot be sustained even if the
number of poor participants changes only slightly..However, I do not refer to the stablity of
this state because it is the switch of the redistribution scheme that is the foucas of this paper.
19In fact, another equilibrium (θ,τ,π) = (0,0,0) exists. However, as described below, we
focus on the established democracy and thus so exclude the case in which any no individual
go to the polls.
15exceeds ˆ h(0), the peculation and the redistribution by the government accrue,
and the state becomes M. In addition, when human capital accumulates, the
state attains P, and the poor become the majority force.
Substituting (6) into (1), the threshold whether the poor are pivotal voters
























¯ h(ξ − δ)
2




≡ ˆ hp (¯ h
)
ˆ hp (0) =
(





ˆ hp (¯ h
)
=









ˆ hp′ (¯ h
)
> 0, ˆ hp′ (0) = 0, lim
¯ h→∞
ˆ hp′ (¯ h
)
= 0
ˆ hp′′ (¯ h
)
R 0 ⇐⇒ ¯ h Q
¯ R
2
It follows that the shape of threshold ˆ hp (¯ h
)
is an increasing cubic curve with
the inﬂection point ¯ h = ¯ R/2. Then, the threshold of human capital regarding















ˆ hm (¯ h
)





φ ≤ ¯ h
In the current paper, ¯ h is parameter but human capital of the rich and the
poor, and thresholds can be viewed as functions of ¯ h. Then, as shown later,
we can produce a ﬁgure that expresses the relationship between the transition
of the redistribution scheme and human capital accumulation under constant
inequality Subsequently, I can state the following proposition.
16Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, in equilibrium, 20
1. An economy in which suﬃcient human capital has been accumulated is
necessary in P state with τp = 0.
2. The transition of the states with human capital accumulation is as follows:
(a) When ˆ hp′ ( ¯ R/2
)
≤ (1 − ξ)/(1 − δ), the state is R → Mʢ→ Pʣ,
and voter turnout is δ → 2δ (→ 1).
(b) When (1 − ξ)/(1 − δ) < ˆ hp′ ( ¯ R/2
)
, under the condition that
(
C − ψ ¯ R
)
/φ
is within a certain range21, the state transits in the direction of
R→ M →P→M ʢ→P), as human capital accumulates ɽThe tran-
sition of voter turnout is δ → 2δ → 1 → 2δ (→ 1); thus, the rela-
tion between human capital accumulation and the transition of voter
turnout is an inverted U-shape.ɽOtherwise the state is R→ M(→ P)
and voter turnout is δ → 2δ (→ 1).
Proposition 1-1 is proved straightforwardly from 0 = lim¯ h→∞ ˆ hp′ (¯ h
)
<
(1 − δ)/ (1 − ξ) and lim¯ h→∞ τp (¯ h
)
= 0, which suggest that, when human cap-
ital accumulates signiﬁcantly, all individuals who have attained a high level of
education vote, and voter turnout becomes 1. Then, we regard this situation as
a kind of extreme. When ˆ hp′ ( ¯ R/2
)
≤ (1 − ξ)/(1 − δ) (proposition 1-2(a)), once
ˆ hp (¯ h
)
crosses the straight line (1 − ξ)¯ h/(1 − δ), regardless of how ¯ h increases,
ˆ hp (¯ h
)
and (1 − ξ)¯ h/(1 − δ) never cross because the maximum slope of ˆ hp (¯ h
)
is less than that of (1 − ξ)¯ h/(1 − δ). Therefore, once the R state transits to
the M state and the M state transits to the P state, the reverse never occurs
and voter turnout monotonically increases.
20Although, by deﬁnition, ξ = δhr/¯ h is in conjunction with ¯ h, herein it is assumed that any
point on the horizontal axis is positioned in such a way that ξ is constant.
21By using the discriminant of the third-degree equation, the rigorous condition under
which the states transit in this way is derived. However, the calculation is complicated and
the implication is diﬃcult to interpret, so I omit it. See also footnote 22.
17Proposition 1-2(b) is one of the main results of this paper, with constant
ξ, voter turnout can be an inverted U-shape as ¯ h increases. This implies that,
even if ¯ h increases or in spite of proceeding the popularization of higher educa-
tion, voter turnout may decrease. This situation takes place when a cubic curve
crosses straight line (1 − ξ)¯ h/(1 − δ) three times, as shown in Fig.1.(The thick
line expresses threshold ˆ h
(¯ h
)
) The inequality (1 − ξ)/(1 − δ) < ˆ hp′ ( ¯ R/2
)
=
2ψ (ξ − δ)
2 /27φ(1 − δ)
222 is the necessary condition that ˆ hp (¯ h
)
and (1 − ξ)¯ h/(1 − δ)
cross at three times. This condition is met more easily when ξ and ψ are large
and δ and φ are small, i.e., income inequality is high and a sense of duty to vote
depends more on the conﬁdence in the government than on an individual’s own
human capital. This means that, in this economy, the redistribution is highly
needed because income inequality is high and individuals tend to trust the gov-
ernment even if it appropriates a part of tax revenue. Therefore, ¯ h is small,
and marginal peculation is large; nonetheless, the poor require more redistri-
bution, and the state transits from M to P.23 As ¯ h increases more, however,
the demand for redistribution becomes small, and larger peculation in the P
state than in the M state, exceeds the eﬀect that marginal peculation dimin-
ishes; as a result, the state reverses the M state and voter turnout decreases
from 1 to 2δ. Under constant inequality, this case expresses the mechanism,
as described in Section 3, whereby individuals are disappointed with the the
government scandals and the ineﬃcient policies and develop a distrust of the
government. As a consequence, the sense of duty to vote declines, and some of
the poor stop going to vote. This process is similar to the fact that, in the 1970s,
22The parameters in which this inequality holds certainly exist. For instance, when ξ → 1,
inequality holds; 0 ≈ (1 − ξ)(1 − δ) < ˆ hp′( ¯ R/2) = 2ψ (ξ − δ)2 /27φ(1 − δ)2 ≈ 2ψ/27φ Then,
ﬁxed ψ, φ, the cubic curve crosses a straght line hp(¯ h) three times by adjusting an intercept
of the cubic curve (C − ψ ¯ R)/φ.
23Alesina and Angeletos(2005) point out that bigger government raises the possibilities for
corruption. Then, those who are especially productive in rent seeking may prefer the high
corruption regime. On the other hand, the poor may prefer a high level of redistribution even
at a cost of high corruption. This indicates the possibility that a large corrupt government
may draw support from an unlikely coalition of the very poor and the rich insiders.
18the developed countries faced the diﬃculties, e.g., two oil crises, an increase of
budget deﬁcit from ineﬃcient and excessive social service, and stagﬂation, and
as a result, several countries, such as U.S. and U.K., cut back the government
size and, coincidentally, voter turnout gradually began to decline.
Fig.1 Human capital accumulation and the transition of
the redistribution schem
5.2 The eﬀect of income inequality
As already indicated, the Gini coeﬃcient in this model is expressed by ξ − δ.
By deﬁnition, ξ = δhr/¯ h changes in conjunction with ¯ h, but, in the previous
subsection, we assumed that ξ was constant. Thus, alternatively in this subsec-
tion, we analyze the eﬀect of an increase of ξ, the fraction of the total income
possessed by the rich.
An increase of ξ aﬀects the equilibrium through two channels. First, an in-
crease of ξ directly increases the income of the rich and decreases the income of
the poor. In the ﬁgures, the angle between two straight lines widens. Then, the
19range in which the redistribution scheme is R becomes large, and the possibility
that an economy is in the R state becomes high. Second, ∂ˆ hp (¯ h
)
/∂ξ > 0 means
that when income inequality grows, the poor require a higher tax rate, and the
government appropriates more. Consequently, the conﬁdence in the government
decreases, and the threshold at which all the poor vote or not becomes high and
in ﬁgures, the cubic curve remains the same intercept
(
C − ψ ¯ R
)
/φ and moves
up. When ξ = δ, thus, the individuals are completely equal, the equilibrium is
always in the P state with (θp,τp,πp) = (0,0,1), and the threshold is horizon-
tal; for any ¯ h, ˆ hp′ (¯ h
)
= 0. Now, if ξ increases slightly, hp = (1 − ξ)¯ h/(1 − δ)
decreases, and the threshold ˆ hp (¯ h
)
becomes a moderate cubic curve; then, the
distinction of the states arises as drawn in Fig.2(a). In this case, the bound-
ary between the states M and P is relatively small, and an economy reaches
the P state with less human capital accumulation. Moreover, as ξ increases,
the slope of hp (¯ h
)
decrease, and that of the threshold ˆ hp (¯ h
)
increases more.
Then, two lines can cross three times, as shown in Fig.1, if inequality holds
(1 − ξ)/(1 − δ) < ˆ hp′ ( ¯ R/2
)
. When ξ increases further, the boundary between
the states M and P becomes larger. Thus, to reach the P state, more human
capital accumulation is needed.(Fig.2 (b))
Fig.2(a) Inequality is low Fig.2(b) Inequality is high
20At this point, there is an interesting relationship between inequality and re-
distribution in this model. In the standard by Meltzer ana Richard (1981), more
unequal income distribution requires more redistribution, but this relationship
is only slightly supported empirically or is at least controversial. Theoretically,
Benabou(2000) emphasizes that, when a decisive agent is richer than the median
and the insurance and credit markets are imperfect, redistribution is U-shaped
with respect to inequality. This takes place due to the following mechanism.
Under low inequality, redistributive policy generates ex ante gains as insurance
against uncertainty. As inequality rises, the proportion of those who stand to
lose from redistribution increase and the demand for distribution decreases. At
high enough levels of inequality, however, redistribution increases with inequal-
ity by the standard eﬀect of the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis. However, endo-
genizing voting behavior as in this model, the validity of the Meltzer-Richard
hypothesis is also ambiguous from a theoretical standpoint but in a diﬀerent
way from Benabou(2000), because growing inequality lowers the human capital
of the poor who are participating less and less in elections. For instance, in-
equality becomes high and the ﬁgure transits from 2(a) to 2(b), the boundary
between the states Mand P shifts to the right, a part of P state in the Fig.2(a)
becomes the M state in the Fig.2(b). Then, the tax rate of the state-switching
part decreases from τp to τm.. As for the boundary between the states R and
M and the case that the state-transition goes through Fig.1, the tax rate of the
state-switching part also decreases.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, even if inequality ξ grows, the
redistribution does not increase in most cases.
Empirically, Larcinese(2007a) shows that the relationship of inequality with
redistribution and social spending is far from clear; in particular, the inclusion
of country-speciﬁc features can alter the results. On the contrary, turnout vari-
21able is robust to the introduction of country-speciﬁc eﬀects in the regression
to public spending on social services and then, he concludes that an increase
in turnout generates more social spending. This robust positive relationship
between turnout and redistribution is consistent with the model of this paper
because, in this model, an increase of turnout means that many poor who require
redistribution vote.
6 Concluding Remarks
Voting frequency and a good education are correlated positively, as many em-
pirical studies show. Then, under the same inequality, voter turnout could be
high or low when human capital accumulation inﬂuences the voting behavior of
individuals. Thus, in an economy in which human capital does not accumulate,
only the more educated, namely, the richer people with a high sense of duty to
vote cast ballots, and voter turnout is low; on the other hand, when the suﬃ-
cient human capital accumulates, the poor also have a strong moral obligation
to vote, and, consequently, voter turnout becomes high. However, an exception
could be considered. When income inequality is high and individuals are re-
sponsive to government scandals, a situation in which all individuals go to the
polls could arise, despite the fact that human capital does not accumulate so
much. Then, the peculation rate becomes so large that individuals, especially
the poor, distrust the government, and a part of the poor stops voting. Hence,
turnout decreases even if human capital accumulates. This mechanism could
be an explanation for the decline of voter turnout in some developed countries
since approximately the 1970s and the various degrees of voter turnout in several
countries with similar inequality.
Increasing inequality often discourages those who have less education from
casting ballots because their sense of duty to vote is not strong. This means that,
22even if inequality increases, only the well-educated,and rich people vote, and
income redistribution is not conducted. This result is diﬀerent from that of the
traditional economic theory as in Meltzer and Richard(1981); large inequality
requires large redistribution. Then, this model could be one of the answers to
the fact that the traditional theory is little supported empirically.
Finally, as an extension of this model, it is essential to consider that income
and income distribution are endogenized, and, thus, an economic model should
be constructed. This seems to be signiﬁcant because such a model would be use-
ful to analyze the relationship and interaction between economy and politics or
economic growth and democracy, e.g., a taxation-redistribution scheme, which
is determined by voting behavior and income distribution, aﬀects economic per-
formance and, conversely, determines voting behavior and income distribution.
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